









Ecole de Management Strasbourg 
Pôle Européen de Gestion et d’Economie  
61 avenue de la Forêt Noire 
67085 Strasbourg Cedex 
 
Institut d'Etudes Politiques  
47 avenue de la Forêt Noire 






de Recherche  

















Concentration in corporate bank loans 
What do we learn from European comparisons? 
 












   1 
Concentration in corporate bank loans 




Christophe J. Godlewski  
Université de Strasbourg, LaRGE et EM Strasbourg Business School 
Pôle Européen de Gestion et d’Economie, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67000 Strasbourg, France 
Tel. : 0390242121 / Fax. : 03902422164 / E-mail : godlewski@unistra.fr 
 
Ydriss Ziane 
Université de Nancy, BETA 
Faculté de Droit, Sciences Economiques et Gestion, 13 Place Carnot, C.O. n°26, 54035 Nancy 
cedex, France. Tel.: 0354504509 / Fax: 0354504489 / E-mail: ydriss.ziane@univ-nancy2.fr 
 
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to empirically investigate the determinants of creditor 
concentration in the use of bank loans by firms in a European cross-country framework. We 
analyze the influence of loan and borrower characteristics but also banking market structure and 
legal enforcement country-specific variables that are expected to influence the financial and 
strategic decision relative to the number of bank lenders. We find that firms tend to diversify 
sources of financing by reducing bank concentration when their level of quality is higher and 
both asymmetric information and the risk of early liquidation are minimal (larger, older, 
transparent, liquid and profitable firms). Furthermore, lenders’ monitoring appears to be an 
important feature of lending concentration, particularly in order to prevent private benefits 
extraction by insiders in legal environment where shareholders benefit from better protections. 
Keywords:  financial intermediation, bank lending, creditor concentration, information 
asymmetry, Europe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature investigating the determinants of bank lending 
concentration in Europe. Multiple banking is a significant economic phenomenon in all 
developed economies, as more than 85 percent of firms borrow from more than one bank and, on 
average, a borrower has more than five bank lending relationships (Ongena and Smith 2000)
2. 
Furthermore, bank borrowing is usually unequal and asymmetric as the average Hirschman-
Herfindhal normalized index equals 34% in Europe, ranging from 28% in the Netherlands to 66% 
in Poland
3
A potential response to these various problems and associated costs is an unequal, asymmetric 
and concentrated bank lending. Such lending structure can mitigate coordination failure and 
renegotiation risk, as well as agency problems between lenders, such as free riding in screening 
and monitoring. Indeed, (Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell 2004)  show that multi-banking can 
mitigate coordination problems, as German firms with low expected cash flows or with lower 
liquidation value of assets prefer concentrated financing. (Guiso and Minetti 2004) find that 
Italian firms with more valuable and redeployable assets deal with lower lenders concentration in 
order to prevent unsound firms from defaulting. In a recent contribution, (Ongena et al. 2008) 
show that concentration is smaller when the borrower is risky, illiquid, large and leveraged, while 
it is larger when the firm is more profitable.  
. From the borrower perspective, a key explanation for multiple banking is the 
mitigation of the hold-up problem of long-term relationship lending and thus the diversification 
of financing sources (Rajan 1992). In crisis periods, especially when “credit crunch” episodes are 
strong, like recently, multiple banking is also relevant for firms to diversify their financial 
stakeholders and to limit the risk of illiquidity from banking origin (Detragiache, Garella and 
Guiso 2000). Furthermore, banks can also gain from multiple banking to tackle limited lending 
capacities (Carletti, Cerasi, and Daltung 2007) and to diversify loans portfolio risk. However, the 
drawback of multiple banking is notably the potential coordination failure problem and 
renegotiation risk in case of borrower distress (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996; Bris and Welch 
2005).  
                                                             
2 See also (Godlewski and Ziane 2008) for recent empirical evidence on multi-banking in Europe. 
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In addition to that empirical banking literature, we propose to investigate which determinants 
drive lenders concentration in a European cross-country framework. Furthermore, we extend 
previous research by analyzing loan and borrower characteristics, but also economic 
characteristics such as banking market structure and legal environment that are expected to 
influence lenders concentration.  
Using a sample of almost 2700 loans to European borrowers, we find that bank lending is less 
concentrated when the borrower is larger, older and more transparent, as well as when he is more 
leveraged, liquid, and profitable. Hence, borrowers with better quality are financed by more 
diffused lending, following arguments relating such lending structure to mitigating early project 
liquidation and to reducing agency problems. Furthermore, banking market concentration and 
shareholders protection imply more concentrated lending. 
The reminder of the article is organized as follows. The theoretical background and hypotheses 
are discussed in section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical design. Results are discussed in 
section 4. Finally, we provide our conclusions in section 5. 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Classical theories of financial intermediation first focused on the necessity for firms, especially 
SMEs, to maintain one bank lending relationship to enhance benefits in terms of funds 
availability, notably. However, theoretical contributions show that a single financial partnership 
could be harmful for firms because it enables banks to accrue monopoly rents (Sharpe 1990). 
Hence, multiple banking may be efficient to reduce informational rents and consequently cost of 
capital, but at the expense of switching costs (Klemperer 1987), duplication of information costs 
(von Thadden 1992)  and less viable monitoring (Carletti 2004). With regards to borrower’s 
distress, multiple creditors may reduce the probability and costs associated with default, as they 
harden the budget constraint for managers, thus decreasing strategic default (Dewatripont and 
Maskin 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein 1996) and reduce inefficient liquidation (Bris and Welch 
2005). Furthermore, numerous bank relationships serve as an insurance against credit crunch and 
illiquidity risks from banking origin (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000).  
However, in the case of borrower’s default, the drawback of multiple bank lending is the 
coordination failure problem. Therefore, asymmetric lending or creditors’ concentration can play   5 
a crucial role in balancing the holdup problem of relationship lending with the coordination 
failure of multiple lending. In other words, these conflicting forces regarding the advantage of 
creditor’s concentration can prompt firms to establish multiple but asymmetric banking 
relationships. In that way, the main bank allow the borrower to retain some of the benefits of 
long-term relationship lending while the presence of less informed “arm’s length” banks can be 
viewed as insurance against illiquidity risk originated from the main bank. The holdup costs 
which arise from a lock-in by main and better informed banks are expected to be particularly 
relevant for opaque firms, which thus have an incentive to develop multiple and diffuse banking 
relationships. Furthermore, weaker concentration can be motivated by risk and monitoring costs 
sharing for lenders, in particular for smaller and younger firms which are considered as more 
opaque and bearing larger specific risk.  
High concentration of creditors can have other important beneficial effects on borrowers. First, in 
case of borrower’s bankruptcy, dispersed creditors face difficulties collecting their claims during 
renegotiations, due to free-riding and coordination problems. As a result, higher quality firms can 
signal their confidence of not going bankruptcy by selecting fewer creditors (Bris and Welch 
2005). Hence, an increase in creditor concentration makes coordination easier either by 
decreasing the likelihood of liquidation or by signaling firm quality. Second, the degree of 
concentration, through enhanced lenders’ ability to screen and monitor, enables the firm to signal 
its willingness to abstain from strategically defaulting, eliminating the risk of inefficient credit 
withdrawal (Bannier 2007). Ultimately, this can reduce the likelihood of financial distress and 
facilitate the renegotiation of debt due to lower coordination costs. Third, by reducing 
coordination failure among creditors it can help a firm to avoid bankruptcy (Bolton and 
Scharfstein 1996; Carmignani and Omiccioli 2007; Brunner and Krahnen 2008). 
However, there are at least two potential drawbacks of creditors’ concentration. First, borrowers 
may have perverse incentives ex-ante leading to opportunistic behavior or excessive risk taking 
due to the soft budget constraint problem (Kornai 1980). If borrowers anticipate that fact, they 
can easily renegotiate their debt contracts ex-post. Second, borrowers are also exposed to greater 
illiquidity risk if lenders experience liquidity problems which in turn increase the risk of 
borrower’s project termination (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000).    6 
In addition, firms characterized by high asset specificity and with low expected cash flow prefer 
concentrated financing (Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell 2004). Optimal allocation of information 
by the firm across multiple banks is related to the level of redeployability of the firm’s assets and 
its restructuring costs (Guiso and Minetti 2004). However, the relationship lender may use this 
greater restructuring ability opportunistically to extract rents during reorganization.  
The following hypotheses summarize the expected influence of borrower main characteristics on 
lenders concentration: 
Hypothesis 1a: Lenders’ concentration increases when the borrower is larger, older and 
less opaque. 
Hypothesis 1b: Lenders’ concentration increases when the borrower is less risky, more 
profitable and liquid. 
Following (Berglof and von Thadden 1994), the choice of financial contracts is determined as a 
trade-off between, on the one hand, the desire to discourage ex post renegotiation (strategic 
default) and, on the other hand, the wish to limit inefficient liquidation when the firm is cash 
constrained (liquidity default). In that context, an entrepreneur can indirectly select the amount of 
bank monitoring by appropriately choosing the number of lending banks: with more banks, there 
is more free-riding and thus less aggregate monitoring. (Mahrt-Smith 2005) provides empirically 
testable implications of the interaction between the nature of the financing relationship and the 
ownership structure. In his model, the structures are designed to trade off managerial discipline 
versus managerial initiative. The main empirical prediction of interest is that concentrated debt 
should be associated with concentrated ownership.  
Hypothesis 2: Lenders’ concentration increases with greater ownership concentration. 
Other theoretical explanations of creditors’ concentration can yield further hypotheses about the 
influence of loan characteristics, as well as economic conditions such as the structure of the 
banking market and the legal environment in a law and finance framework.  
Greater maturity is associated with greater monitoring costs as long-term loans incur control of 
guarantee and covenant costs. Furthermore, if we consider a positive relationship between   7 
maturity and credit risk (Flannery 1986), lenders’ concentration should be stronger to enhance 
monitoring efforts and prevent free-riding, as well as to resolve potential borrower distress more 
efficiently. The presence of guarantees in the loan contract may solve the problem of adverse 
selection thanks to the better information owned by the borrower in comparison to the bank 
before the lending decision. Therefore, high-quality borrowers have incentives to show their 
quality, using a credible signal, one that cannot be provided by low-quality borrowers. Guarantee 
or collateral is such a signal, as it is more costly for low-quality borrowers since they have a 
higher chance of defaulting and hence of losing the collateral (Bester 1985; Besanko and Thakor 
1987). Furthermore, restricting the discretionary power of the borrower and thus moral hazard 
problems through covenants can reduce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995) and 
enhances the ability to monitor the borrower. 
Hypothesis 3:  Lenders’ concentration increases when guarantees and covenants are 
absent in the loan contract and when the loan maturity is longer. 
Market concentration leads to market power and thus lower supply and higher prices. However, 
recent evidence shows that competition and bank are not necessarily inimical (Degryse and 
Ongena 2007). In a seminal contribution, (Ongena and Smith 2000) show that countries with a 
high banking market concentration have fewer banking relationships. 
Hypothesis 4:  Lenders’ concentration increases when the banking market is less 
concentrated and more cost efficient. 
Lenders’ concentration is also expected to depend on the legal environment, which determines 
the protection of creditors as well as law enforcement. In countries where creditor protection is 
weak, the cost of strategic default is low. In that case, proper discipline can be implemented 
through the level of creditors’ concentration. Indeed, (Ongena and Smith 2000) find that more 
diffuse lending is related to stronger creditor protection. However, a more efficient bankruptcy 
procedure with adequate law enforcement may decrease lenders’ concentration because it reduces 
the costs of lending for a given bank.  Furthermore, in countries with low shareholders’ 
protection, the difficulty in raising external finance should induce firms to maintain relations with 
a small number of long-term investors who screen the firm’s investment opportunities and really 
monitor its management (Rajan and Zingales 1998).   8 
Hypothesis 5: Lenders’ concentration increases when creditors’ and shareholders’ rights 
law enforcement are weaker. 
After having drawn from the existing literature our main testable hypotheses on the determinants 
of lender concentration, we now turn to the description of the empirical design of the paper. 
3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1. DATA AND VARIABLES 
Loan characteristics are obtained from the Dealscan database, provided by the Loan Pricing 
Corporation (LPC), Reuters, while firm characteristics are extracted from the Amadeus database 
provided by Bureau Van Dijk. Market structure, financial development and legal environment 
characteristics are gathered from various databases (la Porta et al. 1998; la Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine 2001). Sample size is mainly dictated by information availability on the variables used in 
the regressions. The final sample contains 2692 loan facilities to borrowers from 12 European 
countries
4
Lenders concentration is measured with the Hirschman-Herfindhal index, normalized to one, 
computed on the lenders shares of the loan provided to a borrower. Then, we use nine variables to 
capture main borrower characteristics expected to influence lenders’ concentration, following 
hypotheses 1a and 1b. First of all, we consider borrower characteristics related to its risk profile 
and the level of information opacity. In that aim, we introduce the following six variables into the 
regressions. Firm size and Firm age capture essentially the degree of borrower’s overall risk and 
opacity, while Leverage, Liquidity, and Profitability provide a more detailed and in-depth insight 
into borrower’s risk characteristics. Euronext, a dummy equal to one if the borrower’s shares are 
listed on the Euronext, is a direct proxy for the firm’s transparency.  
 over a period of 9 years (from 1998 to 2006). 
Independence and Shareholders are the proxy variables taking borrower’s ownership structure 
into account, in order to empirically test hypothesis 2. The former is an index characterizing the 
degree of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders (A: strong independence to 
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D), while the latter is the number of shareholders of the firm. According to hypothesis 2, we 
expect a negative sign for both of these variables.  
We also take loan characteristics into account through seven variables related to main terms of 
the loan agreement. Loan size  is the logarithm of the loan facility amount and should be 
negatively related to lenders concentration because of risk diversification and sharing purposes. 
The maturity of the loan is in months, while the presence of guarantors and of financial covenants 
is taken into account through dummies. Following hypothesis 3, we expect lenders concentration 
to increase with the absence of guarantors and covenants, and with loan maturity. We also control 
for the main loan type (Revolver) and purpose (Debt repayment) through the inclusion of 
dummies in our regressions. Finally, we also take the fact that the loan is syndicated into account 
with the Syndication dummy. The expected signs for the loan type and purpose variables are a 
matter of empirical results.  We can advocate that revolving loans might need more intense 
monitoring and thus imply a concentrated lending. Syndicated loans should be funded with a 
more diffuse lending structure because of the specific nature of the syndication market where 
numerous lenders are expected to participate. 
Our third set of variables takes economic characteristics of the borrower country into account in 
order to test hypotheses 4 and 5. Market concentration and Bank costs are two proxies for the 
banking market structure, equal to the assets of the three largest banks as a share of all 
commercial banks and to the ratio of bank overhead costs to total assets respectively. We expect a 
positive sign for both of these variables, according to hypothesis 4. Creditor rights, Shareholders 
rights, and Rule of law are three proxies for the legal environment in the borrower country. These 
are indexes aggregating creditors’ and shareholders’ rights, as well as assessing the law and order 
tradition. According to hypothesis 5, we expect the creditor and shareholder rights indexes to 
have negative signs, while the influence of the rule of law on lenders concentration remains a 
matter of empirical results.  Indeed, both signs can be expected, as better law and order tradition 
can allow for more diffuse lending structure because of lower legal risk regarding borrower’s 
distress handling and loan agreement re-contracting. However, it can also imply greater lenders 
concentration in order to improve screening and monitoring of potentially lazy lenders who might 
rely more on the legal environment enforcement than on their own capacities. Finally, we control   10 
for the development of the credit market through the Credit development variable (ratio of private 
credit of deposit banks and other financial institutions to GDP). 
We also control for the fact that a borrower is from Eastern Europe, where different economic, 
financial and legal environment might drive the lending structure. We expect the dummy Eastern 
Europe to have a positive sign because of greater opacity of such borrowers, implying a greater 
concentration of lenders. Finally, we control through dummies the year of loan activation and the 
industry sector of the borrower. 
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND METHODOLOGY 
Table 1 provides the definitions and main descriptive statistics for all the variables. We first 
remark that the average lenders concentration is above 30% for the full sample. This average 
ranges from 20% to 30% for Western European countries such as Finland, Netherlands or 
Portugal, while it is between 40% and 60% for Eastern European countries such as Croatia, 
Poland or Slovakia
5
Regarding borrower characteristics, we observe that firms are on average relatively large and 
mature (size above 3 millions USD and age above 14 years), with satisfactory liquidity and 
profitability (ratios close to 100% and 13%, respectively) and weakly leveraged (close to 2). 
Almost 1 out of 4 firms is quoted on the Euronext list, with a medium independence towards 
shareholders (above B), who are relatively numerous (close to 40). Finally, 25% of the borrowers 
are from Eastern Europe. 
.  
The average loan facility equals 573 thousands USD for a maturity of 7.5 years. These loans have 
rarely a guarantor or financial covenants (12.8% and 7%, respectively) and are mostly revolving 
facilities funding debt repayment (78.8% and 81.2%, respectively).  
Finally, banking markets are quite concentrated on average (75.8%) but cost efficient (ratio of 
overhead costs to total assets equals 3%), while credit markets are developed (private credit ratio 
to GDP equals 81.2%). On average, creditors are rather poorly protected (index equals 1.4) while 
shareholders benefit from an ‘intermediate’ protection (index equals 2.4), with very strong rule of 
law (index equals 9.8). 
                                                             
5 (Ongena et al. 2008) find that lenders concentration in Germany ranges on average between 53% and 64%.   11 
The breakdown of the average lenders concentration by main explanatory variables involved in 
testing our hypothesis is provided in table 2
6. We remark that hypothesis 1a is validated (except 
for the opacity argument) as larger and older firms have on average greater lenders concentration. 
Regarding hypothesis 1b, only the argument regarding profitability holds, while we would reject 
that hypothesis with respect to leverage and liquidity. With respect to hypothesis 2, we remark 
that lenders concentration is stronger when there are fewer shareholders, although stronger 
independence of the firm towards its shareholders is related to a lower lenders concentration. We 
also observe that the absence of guarantor and covenants is related to greater concentration, as 
expected in hypothesis 3, although the argument on maturity is not validated by the data. Finally, 
hypothesis 4 is partially validated as lenders are more concentrated when bank cost efficiency is 
higher, but it is less concentrated when banking market concentration is higher. This univariate 
analysis confirms, at least partially, several of our hypotheses. Nevertheless, a multivariate 
analysis is needed to take all the hypotheses into account.  
To investigate the influence of borrower, loan and economic characteristics on lenders 
concentration in Europe and to test our hypothesis, we use Tobit regressions (with standard errors 
clustered at the loan level) as the explained variable is bounded between 0 and 1. The main 




We perform series of regression on the full sample with four different specifications: borrower 
and loan characteristics only, and then we progressively add banking market structure 
characteristics, creditor rights protection and finally shareholder rights protection
7
                                                             
6 A breakdown using the median of Creditor rights, Shareholder rights and Rule of law wouldn’t be very consistent 
as these indexes are quite homogenous in our sample. 
.  
7Due to the correlation structure, we cannot introduce all economic characteristics in the same regression.   12 
The results for the four specifications on the full sample are provided in table 3. We remark that 
the specification with creditor rights (3) has the lowest statistical quality with respect to the 
Fisher statistic, while the specification with shareholders rights index (4) has the largest one.  
Regarding borrowers’ characteristics, we conclude that both hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected, 
although the results of the univariate analysis were validating these hypotheses (table 2). More 
precisely, larger, older and transparent firms are funded by less concentrated lenders, and this 
result is consistent across all of the specifications. Riskier (in term of leverage) and more 
profitable borrowers are funded by a more diffuse lenders’ structure, while liquidity has a 
different influence on lenders concentration depending on the specification. When taking 
economic characteristics into account, concentration is negatively influenced by borrower 
liquidity, while the impact is positive when taking individual characteristics only into account. As 
the statistical quality of the model is larger when more characteristics are taken into account, we 
conclude that liquidity is negatively related to lenders concentration.  
Avoiding holdup costs by the borrower or sharing risk and monitoring costs by the lenders 
doesn’t explain these results.  Also, the argument relative to the value of lenders concentration as 
a signal of borrower quality regarding strategic default and bankruptcy risk doesn’t fit the results. 
The only arguments that could fit follow (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso 2000), where a diffuse 
lending structure mitigates project early liquidation in case of lenders distress. Furthermore, such 
a lending structure could also mitigate the opportunistic behavior or excessive risk taking by the 
borrower if he anticipates easy renegotiation of debt contracts. Nevertheless, our results are 
partially in line with (Elsas, Heinemann, and Tyrell 2004; Guiso and Minetti 2004). 
As to borrower’s ownership structure influence, we remark that more independent firms are 
funded by diffuse lenders while the impact of the number of shareholders is varying with the 
specification used. It is negative in specification (1) with individual characteristics only, but 
becomes positive when taking bank market structure into account (2). However, the effect of 
ownership structure variables on lenders concentration vanishes away when taking more 
economic characteristics into account, especially the ones controlling for creditors’ and 
shareholders’ rights protection. Hence, we partially accept hypothesis 2, thus validating the 
argument related to a trade-off between managerial discipline and initiative, following (Mahrt-
Smith 2005) and the role of lending structure in performing greater aggregate monitoring. We   13 
also remark that lending is more concentrated when the borrower is located in an Eastern 
European country, as expected, due to greater opacity of firms on these markets. 
Turning to loan characteristics, we conclude that hypothesis 3 is overall validated, as the 
coefficient signs for Guarantor and Covenants are significantly negative across specifications. 
Thus, these loan agreement features act as signals of borrower quality and as devices reducing 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems, following (Bester 1985; Besanko and Thakor 
1987), and (Rajan and Winton 1995), and hence, allows a more diffuse lending structure. Loan 
maturity has no significant influence on lenders concentration. Larger and syndicated loans are 
usually associated to more diffuse lending for risk sharing and diversification reasons.  
Regarding economic characteristics, hypothesis 4 is not validated as banking market 
concentration has a significant and positive influence on lenders concentration, while Bank costs 
has no significant effect. In some sense, it seems that lenders replicate the market structure where 
the borrower is located, and greater market power is associated with greater concentration in 
lending.  
Finally, among the stakeholders’ rights, only shareholders’ index has a significant and positive 
impact on lenders concentration. This result partially invalidates hypothesis 5 and do not confirm 
the arguments developed by (Rajan and Zingales 1998). This apparently surprising result can be 
explained following recent evidence provided by (Volpin 2001). This author shows that firm’s 
entrepreneur chooses more bank monitoring in countries with better investor protection because 
the benefits of this type monitoring is greater, as it prevents private benefits extraction by firm’s 
managers. This explanation fits our empirical results. 
Overall, lending concentration in Europe is lower when borrowers’ quality is greater (older, 
larger and more transparent firms, which are profitable and liquid), fitting theoretical arguments 
linking bank lending structure to mitigation of early project liquidation. We also observe such a 
diffuse lending structure when the loan contract involves guarantees and covenants, which serve 
as signals of counterparty quality and reduce agency problems. Lenders’ monitoring appears to 
be important as the influence of borrower’s independency towards its shareholders reflects a 
trade-off between managerial discipline and initiative. Furthermore, bank monitoring becomes   14 
more useful to prevent private benefits extraction by managers in legal environment where 
shareholders benefit from a better protection, as the latter increases lenders’ concentration. 
5. CONCLUSION 
During the last decade, financial behaviors involving frequently bank switching became the rule 
rather than the exception. In this paper, we tried to understand the main influences of variables 
relative to borrowers, loans and banking and legal variables on the degree of lenders 
concentration. Retail banking activities are financial but first of all strategic. Due to asymmetric 
information problems ex-ante, modifying prices for loans could not be an efficient solution for 
banks to limit their exposition to default risk. However, the “book-keeping” function and 
customer relationship management allows financial intermediaries to distinguish risk profiles and 
transaction buyers from relationship buyers. Conversely, firms and especially smallest and 
opaque ones face hard difficulties to obtain loans due to their lack of transparency. Our results on 
a large European panel of firms demonstrated that tangible information is determinant to be able 
to deal with multiple financial partners and benefit from associated benefits in terms of costs and 
credit availability. From the borrower point of view, the recent financial crisis put into light that 
illiquidity and early liquidation risks from banking origin are real and socially costly in terms of 
bankruptcy and job destruction, notably. Recent European discussion regarding the necessity to 
promote bank mobility for individuals and firms in all countries are welcoming because banking 
industry still concentrated.      
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Table 1. Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables 
This table provides the definitions and main descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regressions. The 
endogenous variable and the loan characteristics come from the Dealscan (LPC, Reuters) database. Firm 
characteristics come from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) database. Economic characteristics come from different 
databases (la Porta et al. 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 2001; la Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
2006; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007). 
Variable   Definition  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Explained variable 
     
Lenders concentration  Hirschman-Herfindhal normalized index computed on the 
lenders shares of the loan to a borrower  2692  .3409  .2389 
Loan characteristics 
   
Loan size   Logarithm of the loan facility amount (in USD)  2692  13.2597  1.0524 
Maturity   Maturity of the loan facility (in months)  2692  60.3696  20.8516 
Guarantor  =1 if there is at least one guarantor  2692  .1277  .3339 
Covenants   =1 if there are financial covenants  2692  .0698  .2549 
Syndication  =1 if the loan is syndicated  2692  .7414  .4379 
Revolver  =1 if revolving loan  2692  .7875  .4091 
Debt repayment   =1 if loan purpose is debt repayment  2692  .8187  .3853 
Firm characteristics 
Firm size  Logarithm of firm’s total assets (in USD)  2692  14.9298  1.7895 
Firm age  Logarithm of firm’s age (in years since creation)  2401  2.6539  1.1306 
Liquidity  (Cash + accounts receivable) / (Current liabilities)  2692  .9871  .2503 
Profitability   Operating profit / Total assets  2692  .1318  .0982 
Leverage  Total debt / Total equity  2692  1.9303  1.4705 
Euronext   =1 if borrower is listed on Euronext  2692  .2373  .4255 
Independence 
Indicator characterizing the degree of independence of a 
company with regard to its shareholders (A: strong 
independence to D) 
2692  2.5820  1.1654 
Shareholders  Number of shareholders  2692  38.1701  29.9583 
Eastern Europe  =1 if the borrower is from Eastern Europe  2692  .2500  .4330 
Economic characteristics 
     
Market concentration  Assets of the three largest banks as a share of all commercial 
banks  1449  .7583  .2099 
Bank costs  Bank overhead costs / Total assets  1449  .0313  .0104 
Credit development  Private credit of deposit banks and other financial institutions / 
GDP  1715  .8187  .4587 
Creditor rights  
Index of assessment of creditor rights (0: weak creditor rights to 
4).    1907  1.3985  .6108 
Shareholder rights  Index of anti-director rights (0: weak anti-director rights to 6).  1907  2.4362  .6913 
Rule of law 
Index of assessment of the law and order tradition (0: less 
tradition for law to 10)  1907  9.7615  .5244   18 
Table 2. Lenders concentration breakdown by main explanatory variables 
This table provides the means of Lenders concentration by main explanatory variables. Definition of all variables is 
provided in Annex 1 (table 1). Large (Small) if Firm size strictly above (below) its median value (15.29). Old 
(Young) if Firm age strictly above (below) its median value (2.70). Transparent (Opaque) if Euronext equals 1 (0). 
High leverage (Low leverage) if Leverage strictly above (below) its median value (1.40). High profit (Low profit) if 
Profitability strictly above (below) its median value (.12). High liquidity (Low liquidity) if Liquidity strictly above 
(below) its median value (1.02). Many shareholders (Few shareholders) if Shareholders strictly above (below) its 
median value (50). Strong independence (Weak independence) if Independence strictly above (below) its median 
value (B). Long maturity (Short maturity) if Maturity  strictly above  (below) its median value (60).Strong 
concentration (Weak concentration) if Market concentration strictly above (below) its median value (0.87). High 
costs (Low costs) if Bank costs strictly above (below) its median value (0.03). T statistic for the test of equal means 
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Firm  Large  Small  Old  Young  Transparent  Opaque 
Lenders 
concentration  .3871  .2949  .3954  .2592  .2407  .3721 
  (15.93***)  (6.68***)  (12.48***) 





concentration  .3570  .3254   .4000  .2860  .2791  .3982 
  (1.74*)  (7.05***)  (13.34***) 







independence     
Lenders 
concentration  .2676  .3929  .3154  .3566     
  (13.87***)  (4.36***)     





concentration  .1566   .3679   .1441   .3556  .2592  .3600 
  (16.03***)  (12.01***)  (8.71***) 
Firm  Strong 
concentration 
Weak 
concentration  High costs  Low costs     
Lenders 
concentration  .3730  .2686  .3835  .2518     
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Table 3. Influence of loan, borrower and economic characteristics on lenders concentration 
This table provides Tobit regression results for the full sample. The dependant variable is Lenders 
concentration. Definition of all variables is provided in table 1. Model (1) includes borrower and 
loan characteristics. Models (2), (3), and (4) include borrower, loan and economic characteristics. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the loan facility level in brackets. Dummy variables for year 
and industry sector included but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate coefficient statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Firm size   0.0091   -.0331***  -.0560***  -.0754*** 
 
(0.0099)   (0.0069)   (0.0155)   (0.0171)  
Firm age   -.0816***  -.0379***  -.0483***  -.0471*** 
 
(0.0108)   (0.0064)   (0.0085)   (0.0095)  
Leverage  -.0952***  -.0410***  -.0550***  -.0443*** 
 
(0.0102)   (0.0087)   (0.0132)   (0.0134)  
Liquidity   0.1707***  -.0427   -.1215***  -.0918*** 
 
(0.0407)   (0.0273)   (0.0362)   (0.0345)  
Profitability   -.9389***  -.3048***  -.2196   -.2215  
 
(0.1146)   (0.1041)   (0.1705)   (0.1546)  
Euronext   -.0958***  -.0942*   -.1009**   -.0820  
 
(0.0184)   (0.0483)   (0.0514)   (0.053)  
Independence   -.0477***  -.0231*   0.0122   0.0108  
 
(0.0106)   (0.0138)   (0.0135)   (0.0131)  
Shareholders   -.0019***  0.0011**   0.0003   0.0004  
 
(0.0007)   (0.0005)   (0.0006)   (0.0006)  
Eastern Europe   0.3065***  0.0631      
 
(0.0274)   (0.0589)      
Loan size  0.0137   -.0550***  -.0236   -.0007  
 
(0.0144)   (0.0144)   (0.0217)   (0.021)  
Maturity   -.0008   0.0001   -.0002   0.0004  
 
(0.0006)   (0.0004)   (0.0007)   (0.0007)  
Guarantor   -.1084***  -.0677***  -.0627***  -.0664*** 
 
(0.0255)   (0.0168)   (0.0212)   (0.0188)  
Covenants  -.2189***  -.0429   -.1399***  -.1318*** 
 
(0.0636)   (0.0507)   (0.0485)   (0.0489)  
Syndicated  -.0976***  -.0089   -.0374   -.0390  
 
(0.0296)   (0.0193)   (0.0262)   (0.0258)  
Revolver  0.1579***  0.0489**   0.06**   0.0307  
 
(0.0261)   (0.0209)   (0.0265)   (0.0281)  
Debt repayment  -.0801*   0.0122   0.0625**   0.0062  
 
(0.0409)   (0.0272)   (0.0317)   (0.035)  
Credit development    0.0718   0.0418   0.0702  
   
(0.0494)   (0.0619)   (0.0545)  
Market concentration     0.247***       20 
   
(0.0594)  
   
Bank costs    -.7993      
   
(1.3361)  
   
Creditors rights       -.0275    
     
(0.0378)  
 
Shareholders rights        0.0849*** 
       
(0.0284)  
Rule of law      0.1178***  0.1226*** 
     
(0.0364)   (0.0321)  
Intercept   0.7464***  1.5216***  0.6788**   0.2838  
 
(0.158)   (0.1505)   (0.2789)   (0.276)  
N. obs.   2401  1424  1302  1302 
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